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Abstract
This paper develops a model to analyze two different bad bank schemes, an outright
sale of toxic assets to a state-owned bad bank and a repurchase agreement between
the bad bank and the initial bank. For both schemes, we derive a critical transfer
payment that induces a bank manager to participate. Participation improves the
bank’s solvency and enables the bank to grant new loans. Therefore, both schemes
can reestablish stability and avoid a credit crunch. An outright sale will be less costly
to taxpayers than a repurchase agreement if the transfer payment is sufficiently low.
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INTRODUCTION
The worldwide financial crisis, which broke out in August 2007, led to severe
losses in the financial sector. Banks suffered from so-called toxic assets in their
balance sheets. Uncertainty about the ”true value” of these assets and necessary
depreciations, which significantly reduced the banks’ capital, raised concerns about
the stability of the banking sector and about a possible significant reduction in credit
supply.
In response to these developments, governments in several countries offered dis-
tressed banks to transfer their toxic assets to publicly sponsored special purpose
vehicles, so-called bad banks. All implemented bad bank schemes have in common
that they clean up the banks’ balance sheet at least temporarily. That is their main
advantage over other regulatory interventions, like e.g. the mitigation of capital
requirements or capital injections. In particular, they differ with respect to the
risk-distribution between the distressed bank and the bad bank, and therefore, the
taxpayers. In Germany, for example, the risk remains largely with the distressed
bank, while in the US (Troubled Asset Relief Program) the bad bank scheme allows
for a more or less complete risk transfer to the bad bank. To mitigate the financial
crisis, a couple of other countries like Ireland (National Asset Management Agency)
and Switzerland also adopted concepts similar to a bad bank scheme. Moreover,
bad bank schemes were occasionally used prior to the worldwide financial crisis.
Examples are the US-Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s and the banking crisis in
Sweden in the early 1990s.1
1For a description of the German and Swiss bad bank scheme see Deutsche Bundesbank (2009)
and Goddard, Molyneux, et al. (2009). Overviews over the Troubled Asset Relief Program and
the National Asset Management Agency can be found in U.S. Department of the Treasury (2009)
and Honohan (2009). The bad bank schemes applied in the Swedish crisis and the US-Savings &
Loan crisis are described in Englund (1999) and FDIC (1997).
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Against this background, this paper develops a model which allows for a compar-
ison of two different bad bank schemes. The first is characterized by a full transfer
of the risk of toxic assets to the taxpayers. Under the second scheme, the risk of
toxic assets remains with the distressed bank.2 In our analysis, we focus on two
particular aspects. First, we investigate whether the different bad bank schemes are
appropriate to stabilize the banking sector and to avoid a credit crunch. Second,
we compare the different bad bank schemes with respect to their expected costs to
taxpayers.
In our theoretical analysis, we consider a single commercial bank whose balance
sheet consists of a risky asset that is funded by equity and deposits. Write-offs on
the asset have led to a situation in which the bank’s equity is just sufficient to meet
a minimum capital requirement. Due to a high degree of uncertainty in the banking
sector the bank is unable to attract new capital. Therefore, it is neither able to
bear further possible depreciations of the toxic asset nor to grant new loans. In
this situation, a risk-neutral bank manager has the opportunity to hive off the toxic
asset to a bad bank. Concerning the risk allocation between the initial bank and the
taxpayers, we consider two extreme cases. In the first case, the bank can make an
outright sale of the toxic asset to a state-owned bad bank. As a consequence, the risk
of the toxic asset is fully borne by the taxpayers. In the second case, the transfer
of the toxic asset to the bad bank involves a repurchase agreement between the
distressed bank and the bad bank implying that the risk of the toxic asset remains
with the distressed bank. The idea of the second scheme is to give the bank some
2The first scheme is similar to the one which has been implemented by the US Federal Reserve
System to tackle the worldwide financial crisis (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2014). The
second resembles the bad bank scheme which has been implemented by the German government
in 2009 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009).
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time to generate profits from its newly granted loans so that it will be able to bear
possible losses from the toxic asset at a later date.
Our theoretical analysis reveals that under both bad bank schemes, the price, at
which the toxic asset can be transferred to the bad bank, plays a crucial role. First,
this transfer price must be high enough to induce the bank manager to participate
in the bad bank scheme. Thus, there exists a minimum transfer price which has to
be paid to stabilize the banking sector, since the banking sector will only become
more stable if the manager transfers the toxic asset. Furthermore, the supply of new
loans increases in the transfer price, i.e. if the danger of a credit crunch is high, the
transfer payment must be sufficiently high to avert this threat.
From our theoretical analysis we conclude that if the transfer price is sufficiently
high, a bad bank will stabilize the banking sector and avoid a credit crunch under
both schemes, an outright sale as well as a repurchase agreement. Concerning the
superiority of one scheme, the expected costs to taxpayers have to be considered.
In case of an outright sale, the taxpayers can benefit from the potential returns
on the toxic asset but do not reobtain the transfer payment. On the contrary, a
repurchase agreement implies that the potential returns on the toxic asset remain
at the distressed bank while the taxpayers reobtain the transfer price at least with
positive probability. Therefore, an outright sale will be superior to a repurchase
agreement only if the necessary transfer payment is relatively low. Otherwise, if the
necessary transfer payment is relatively high, the repurchase agreement concept will
involve less expected costs to the taxpayers.
The related literature on bad bank schemes can be divided into three groups.
The first group examines bad bank schemes that were implemented prior to the
worldwide financial crisis. White (1991) and Curry and Shibut (2000) explore the
US-Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s. Macey (1999) and Bergstro¨m, Englund, and
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Thorell (2003) analyze the banking crisis in Sweden in the early 1990s. Particularly
the implementation of bad banks in the Swedish banking crisis is often viewed as the
textbook case of banking crises resolution. However, its applicability to the recent
financial crisis is limited because the Swedish crisis was confined to a relatively small
part of Europe while the world economy favored a quick recovery. Moreover, the
banks’ toxic assets were predominantly book credits. Therefore, problems that are
inherent in complex innovative financial products which were a main driving force of
the financial crisis of 2007, did not exist. The second group discusses the pros and
cons of bad bank schemes from a political economy perspective in the light of the
worldwide financial crisis.3 Our paper is most closely related to the third group of the
literature, which develops theoretical models to analyze governmental bank bailout
policies. While the effects of different recapitalization plans for distressed banks are,
in general, relatively well understood, the theoretical literature particularly focussing
on bad bank schemes is still in its infancy. Tirole (2012) analyzes state-sponsored
asset purchases to restart an illiquid market. Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1999),
Corbett and Mitchell (2000), Mitchell (1998, 2001), and Tanaka and Hoggarth (2006)
investigate the effects of recapitalization plans on a bank manager’s incentive to
misreport the amount of the bank’s loan losses either to avoid recapitalization or
to realize excessive government support, respectively. Mailath and Mester (1994),
Osano (2002, 2005), and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) study the risk of moral
hazard inherent in governmental bailouts. While Mailath and Mester (1994) as
well as Osano (2002, 2005) analyze the behavior of a single bank, Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2008) look at the entire banking sector and the banks’ incentive to
herd in their investment decisions to increase the risk that many banks may fail
3See, e.g., Bebchuk (2008), Fitzpatrick (2008), Bebchuk (2009), Buiter (2009), Hall and Woodward
(2009), Panetta, Faeg, et al. (2009), Scha¨fer and Zimmermann (2009) and van Suntum and
Ilgmann (2011).
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together. Several papers compare different forms of policy measures to stop a fall in
loan supply following a banking crisis. Philippon and Schnabl (2010) argue that in a
crisis capital injections are more efficient than asset purchases and debt guarantees.
Elsinger and Summer (2010) support these results. Bhattacharya and Nyborg (2010)
propose that capital injections and asset purchases are the most efficient forms of
recapitalization. Dietrich and Hauck (2012) show that while debt or capital subsidies
can lead to overinvestment and excessive risk taking, a sale of toxic assets to a
bad bank does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
Wilson (2012) point out that bad banks and capital injections both dominate state-
sponsored purchases of preferred stock. Wilson and Wu (2012) show that these
results are still valid when a policy maker tries to avoid risk shifting of a bank in
financial distress. While these contributions compare a single bad bank scheme,
which is similar to an outright sale, to other forms of public interventions, our
paper is the first that explicitly compares different bad bank schemes in a unified
framework. In particular, we investigate two bad bank schemes, an outright sale and
a repurchase agreement, with respect to their appropriateness for reestablishing the
stability of the banking sector and avoiding a credit crunch as well as with respect
to their expected costs to taxpayers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops the model and derives
the critical transfer payment at which the bank manager is willing to participate in
the respective bad bank schemes. Section 2 discusses policy implications, section 3
concludes the paper.
1 THE MODEL
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1.1 Framework
We consider a risk-neutral, zero-interest-rate economy where the asset side of a
commercial bank’s balance sheet consists of an illiquid risky asset.4 The commercial
bank must back this asset with sufficient capital due to a minimum capital require-
ment. Write-offs on the asset have reduced the bank’s capital down to the minimum
amount the bank must hold to fulfill this requirement.5
The bank faces new lending opportunities. As these loans are risky, they must
also be backed with sufficient capital. However, the bank is unable to attract fresh
outside capital. In the spirit of Diamond and Rajan (2001), this may be due to a
potential hold-up problem between the bank manager and outside financiers, that
can only be solved if the bank issues demandable deposits, which serve as a dis-
ciplinary device for the bank manager. Consequently, the bank cannot grant new
loans unless it obtains outside help.
In this situation, the bank manager has the option to hive off the impaired asset
to a government-owned bad bank. If he decides to do so, he can exchange the asset
for safe government bonds. This transaction allows him to grant new loans since
government bonds are not subject to a capital requirement.
No Transfer of the Toxic Asset, No New Loans
There are two dates t = 0, 1. At date t = 0 the bank possesses an impaired risky
financial asset (toxic asset). The asset matures at date t = 1. At this date, it
4Due to its complex structure, only a limited set of potential buyers is able to value this asset.
Therefore, there is only limited liquidity, normalized to zero, to purchase the asset (Diamond and
Rajan, 2011).
5Adding safe assets and/or further risky assets to the balance sheet would complicate the subse-
quent formal analysis without yielding much additional insight. Therefore, we stick to the simplest
case in which the bank possesses a risky asset only.
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Assets Liabilities
Toxic Asset θY Deposits DnB
Capital V nB0
Figure 1: No Transfer of the Toxic Asset, Balance Sheet at t = 0.
yields a (gross) return K˜, which is equal to Y > 0 with probability θ and zero with
probability 1− θ.
Figure 1 presents the balance sheet at t = 0 for the case that the bank manager
does not hive off the toxic asset to a bad bank. Then, he will not be able to grant
new loans. Accordingly, the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet consists of the
risky asset only. Its book value is given by its expected gross return θY .6 The
liability side consists of deposits DnB and capital V nB0 (the superscript nB indicates
that the manager does not transfer the risky asset to a bad bank, the subscript 0
stands for date t = 0). The balance sheet identity at t = 0 is therefore
θY = DnB + V nB0 . (1)
The bank’s capital just meets the capital requirement. It satisfies V nB0 = rθY , where
r ∈ (0, 1) denotes the minimum ratio of capital to risky assets. In conjunction with
the balance sheet identity (1), this implies
DnB = (1− r)θY . (2)
6Throughout the paper, we assume that any asset is valued either at expected gross return or by
its initial nominal value, depending on which amount is smaller. Thus, the expected gross return
of the toxic asset at t = 0 is smaller than its initial face value so that a write-off has become
inevitable.
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Assets Liabilities
Toxic Asset Y
Insurance 0
Deposits DnB
Capital Y −DnB
Solvency: K˜ = Y ≥ DnB
Assets Liabilities
Toxic Asset 0
Insurance DnB
Deposits DnB
Capital 0
Insolvency: K˜ = 0 < DnB
Figure 2: No Transfer of the Toxic Asset, Balance Sheet at t = 1.
The balance sheet at t = 1 is shown in Figure 2. We assume that a full deposit
insurance exists, so that depositors do not bear any losses.7 They receive DnB
irrespective of the actual return on the risky asset. In contrast, the capital value
and the insurance payment depend on the outcome of the risky asset at t = 1. With
probability θ, the asset succeeds in which case its return K˜ = Y suffices to repay
DnB to depositors. Consequently, the bank will be solvent, the insurance must not
pay anything and capital holders will receive the residual return Y −DnB (see the
left hand side of Figure 2). With probability 1−θ, the asset fails, K˜ = 0. Then, the
bank will be insolvent, the insurance must pay DnB to depositors and capital will
be worthless. This case is shown on the right hand side of Figure 2. Accordingly,
from a date t = 0 perspective, the bank is expected to be solvent with probability θ
and the expected value of bank capital satisfies
E[V˜ nB1 ] = θ(Y −DnB). (3)
Transfer of the Toxic Asset, New Loans
At t = 0, the bank manager has the opportunity to hive off the risky asset to a
government-owned bad bank. If he decides to do so, he will incur non-pecuniary
stigma costs B which reflect a loss of reputation for the manager. Furthermore, the
7For the sake of simplicity we abstain from modeling a deposit insurance premium.
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Assets Liabilities
New Loans L0
Government Bonds Z Deposits DB
Capital V B0
Figure 3: Transfer of the Toxic Asset, Balance Sheet at t = 0.
bank will obtain safe government bonds worth Z in exchange for the risky asset.
This transfer payment Z must satisfy
Z ≥ DnB. (4)
Otherwise the bank would be bankrupt directly after having transferred its risky
asset.
Figure 3 presents the resulting balance sheet at t = 0. The asset side consists
of the newly obtained government bonds Z and the volume L0 of newly granted
loans. These loans are valued at their nominal value L0 since there have not been
any write-offs yet. The bank can grant these loans because government bonds are
not subject to capital requirements. The bank’s liabilities consist of deposits DB
and capital V B0 (where the subscript B indicates that the manager has transferred
the risky asset to the bad bank) so that the balance sheet identity at t = 0 is
Z + L0 = D
B + V B0 . (5)
Since the bank is unable to attract new capital and is not allowed to sell the govern-
ment bonds, it must refinance new loans by acquiring new deposits. The supply of
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fully insured deposits is totally elastic. Therefore, the total volume DB of deposits
is given by the sum of ”old” deposits DnB and the volume L0 of new loans:
DB = DnB + L0. (6)
At t = 1, the return on the new loans is a random variable denoted by L˜1. With
probability θnew, the loans are successful and yield (1+α)L0, where α reflects the net
rate of return on these loans. With probability 1− θnew, they fail and yield nothing.
The newly granted loans are less risky than the toxic asset, θnew > θ. Moreover,
they have a positive expected net return per unit, θnew(1 + α) > 1. The returns of
the new loans and the toxic asset are uncorrelated.8
The properties of the balance sheet at t = 1 depend on the concrete design of
the bad bank scheme. We will analyze two different schemes. The first corresponds
to an outright sale of the toxic asset to the bad bank. Under this scheme, the bank
manager exchanges the risky asset for safe government bonds at t = 0. Thereafter,
no further transaction takes place between the bank and the bad bank. That is, the
bank neither bears further losses of the risky asset nor benefits from its potential
profits. The second scheme resembles a repurchase agreement. While the impaired
asset is still transferred to the bad bank at t = 0 in exchange for safe government
bonds, the bank now agrees to buy the asset back at t = 1 and to return the
government bonds at this date. Under this scheme, the bank still bears the risk of
8This assumption does not affect our qualitative results.
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the toxic asset but also participates in possible profits.9 We discuss the implications
of both schemes for the balance sheet at t = 1 below.
Preferences
The bank manager aims to maximize his utility. When deciding on whether to
transfer the toxic asset to the bad bank or not, he therefore compares his utility
under both situations. If he does not transfer the asset, his utility UnB will depend
on the expected capital value E[V˜ nB1 ] only. Instead, if he transfers the asset, his
utility UB will be determined by the expected capital value E[V˜ B1 ] and the non-
pecuniary stigma costs:
UnB = E[V˜ nB1 ], (7)
UB = E[V˜ B1 ]−B. (8)
Thus, we assume that the utility function is additively separable between the pecu-
niary expected capital value and the non-pecuniary stigma costs.
1.2 New Lending
If the bank manager participates in a bad bank scheme, he will be able to grant new
loans. However, these loans are risky, so that the bank manager must back them
9This scheme aims at allowing a participating bank to originate profitable loans by releasing
equity that has previously been used to meet regulatory capital requirement for toxic assets.
Future returns on these loans should enable the bank to potentially bear future losses from its
toxic assets. The bad bank scheme implemented by the German governement in 2009 has been
designed in this spirit. It stipulates that while a bank can sell its toxic assets to a state-sponsored
special purpose vehicle (the bad bank), it is still responsible for compensating losses incurred
by the bad bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009). However, the German scheme does not require
the bank to build up reserves to cover these potential losses, see Institut der Wirtschaftspru¨fer
(2009) and the Accounting Standards Committee of Germany (2009), because the responsibility
to cover actual losses is subject to the bank making profits. Moreover, the toxic assets on the
bank’s balance sheet are replaced by safe government guaranteed bonds which are not subject to
regulatory capital requirements.
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with capital. To keep the exposition simple, we assume that new loans are subject
to the same minimum capital requirement as the toxic asset. Accordingly, to the
minimum capital requirement, bank capital must satisfy V B0 ≥ rL0. In conjunction
with (2), (5) and (6), this directly leads to
Lemma 1: If the bank manager hives off the toxic asset to the bad bank at t = 0,
the volume of new loans must satisfy
L0 ≤ 1r (Z −DnB) = θY + 1r (Z − θY ) =: Lmax0 (Z). (9)
The Lemma reveals that the minimum capital requirement imposes a restriction
on the volume of new loans. According to (9), the maximum loan volume Lmax0
depends on the size of the transfer payment Z relative to the book value θY of
the toxic asset. To interpret this maximum loan volume, it is useful to distinguish
between two effects that a bad bank scheme can have on the bank manager’s ability
to grant new loans.
First, there will be an asset substitution effect (first term on the right hand side
of (9)). The bad bank scheme allows the manager to replace his risky asset by safe
government bonds. As long as the transfer payment is equal to the book value of the
risky asset, Z = θY , participation in the bad bank scheme leaves the bank’s capital
unchanged. However, this capital, which has been used to back the risky asset,
is now available for backing loans since government bonds do not require capital
backing. Therefore, an amount equal to the book value of the toxic asset θY can be
granted as new loans.
Second, there will be a capital change effect whenever the transfer payment Z
differs from the book value θY of the toxic asset (second term on the right hand
side of (9)). This effect is due to the bank’s additional capital (in case of Z > θY )
13
Assets Liabilities
Government Bonds Z
New Loans L˜1
Insurance 0
Deposits DB
Capital Z + L˜1 −DB
Solvency: Z + L˜1 ≥ DB
Assets Liabilities
Government Bonds Z
New Loans L˜1
Insurance DB − (Z + L˜1)
Deposits DB
Capital 0
Insolvency: Z + L˜1 < DB
Figure 4: OS-scheme: Balance sheet at t = 1 if manager transfers the toxic assets.
or capital loss (in case of Z < θY ) when participating in a bad bank. If Z > θY ,
the bank will receive additional capital. Multiplied by 1
r
> 1 we obtain the amount
of new loans that can additionally be granted. If Z < θY , the bank will ”lose”
capital with the transfer of the risky asset to the bad bank. Therefore, the amount
of new loans is lower than the book value θY of the risky asset.Consequently, Lmax0
increases in Z since either, there is an increase in additional capital or a decrease in
lost capital:
∂Lmax0
∂Z
= 1
r
> 0.
1.3 Outright Sale of the Toxic Asset (OS-Scheme)
In this section, we analyze a bad bank scheme, which resembles an outright sale
(OS) of the toxic asset. Under the OS-scheme, the bank manager can exchange the
asset for safe government bonds worth Z at t = 0. This transaction is irrevocable.
Consequently, the bank neither has to bear any losses nor can benefit from any
return of the toxic asset at t = 1.
14
The Commercial Bank’s Balance Sheet at t = 1 and Expected Capital
Value
The consequences of a participation in the OS-scheme for the bank’s balance sheet
at t = 1 are shown in Figure 4. The asset side consists of the government bonds, the
new loans and a possible payment from the deposit insurance while the liability side
consists of deposits and capital. The figure distinguishes between two scenarios. If
the government bonds and the return of the new loans cover the volume of deposits,
Z + L˜1 ≥ DB, the bank will be able to meet its liabilities vis-a-vis depositors at
t = 1. It is thus solvent. Therefore, it will pay DB to depositors, the insurer will pay
nothing, and capital holders will obtain the residual return Z + L˜1 − DB (see the
left hand side of figure 4). On the contrary, if the total return Z + L˜1 falls short of
DB, the bank will be insolvent. In this case, the bank’s assets will be used to repay
deposits, the insurance must settle the remaining claim DB− (Z+ L˜1) of depositors,
and the value of capital will be zero (see the right hand side of figure 4).
From the discussion of the bank’s balance sheet, it follows that the value of bank
capital at t = 1 is equal to max{0,Z + L˜1 − DB}. At this date, there can be two
states of the world. The new loans succeed with probability θnew. Then, they yield
a (gross) return (1+α)L0 and the bank will be solvent.
10 With probability 1−θnew,
the new loans yield no return. In this case, the bank will be solvent only if Z ≥ DB.
As a consequence, from the perspective of date t = 0, the expected date t = 1
capital value satisfies
E[V B1 ] = θnew(Z + (1 + α)L0 −DB) + (1− θnew) max{0,Z −DB}. (10)
10To see this, note that if the new loans succeed, it follows from (4) that Z+ L˜1 = Z+(1+α)L0 ≥
DnB + (1 + α)L0 while (6) implies D
B = DnB + L0 < D
nB + (1 + α)L0. Accordingly, we have
Z + L˜1 > D
B so that the bank is solvent.
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Inserting (6) in (10) yields
E[V B1 ] = θnew(Z + αL0 −DnB) + (1− θnew) max{0,Z −DnB − L0}, (11)
Since the new loans have a positive expected net return, θnew(1 + α) > 1, it follows
from (10) that the expected capital value at t = 1 is increasing in the loan volume,
∂E[V B1 ]
∂L0
> 0.
The Bank Manager’s Optimizing Behavior
If the bank manager transfers the toxic asset to the bad bank at t = 0, he will
maximize the utility as given in (8). This utility is increasing in the expected capital
value E[V B1 ] which again increases in L0, so that it is optimal for the manager
to grant the maximum possible amount of new loans Lmax0 if he participates in
the OS-scheme. We can infer from (6) and (9) that granting these loans requires
DB = Z+(1−r)Lmax0 . Consequently, the bank will be insolvent if the new loans fail
because then, the available government bonds worth Z will not suffice to satisfy the
depositors’ total claim DB. Thus, the bank will be solvent at t = 1 with probability
θnew if the bank manager hives off the toxic asset to the bad bank. Together with
(6), (8) and (10), this implies that the bank manager’s utility UB of participating
in the OS-scheme will be
UB = θnew(Z + αL
max
0 (Z)−DnB)−B. (12)
By contrast, if the manager decides against transferring the asset, it follows from
(3) and (7) that the bank will be solvent with probability θ so that his utility
UnB = θ(Y −DnB). (13)
16
The bank manager is willing to transfer the asset to the bad bank at t = 0 only
if UB ≥ UnB. Inserting (12) and (13) into this condition and rearranging terms
yields:
θnewZ + θnewαL
max
0 (Z) ≥ θY + (θnew − θ)DnB +B. (14)
Condition (14) states that the bank manager will decide in favor of the bad bank
scheme if his expected benefits are not outweighed by the expected costs. The left
hand side of (14) reflects the manager’s expected benefits of transferring the toxic
asset to a bad bank, the right hand side reflects his expected costs. The expected
benefits stem from the government bonds Z and the potential return αLmax0 of the
newly granted loans. The manager will benefit from both only if the new loans turn
out to be successful, since otherwise the bank will be insolvent so that Z will be used
to repay depositors and the new loans yield nothing. Therefore, Z and αLmax0 have
to be multiplied by θnew. The expected costs consist of the foregone expected (gross)
return θY of the toxic asset, an increase in expected old liabilities (θnew − θ)DnB
and the stigma costs B. Expected old liabilities increase by (θnew−θ)DnB because if
the bank manager participates in the OS-scheme, the probability of bank solvency
will increase from θ to θnew. That is, it becomes more likely that the bank will
repay depositors without aid from the deposit insurer.After inserting (9) into the
condition (14) and rearranging terms, we obtain
Proposition 1: Under the OS-scheme, the bank manager will transfer the toxic
asset to the bad bank and the probability of the bank’s solvency will increase from θ
to θnew only if
Z ≥ θY + r
θnew(α+r)
[B − B̂] =: Z∗OS, (15)
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where B̂ is defined by
B̂ = θnewθY + θnewαθY − θY − (θnew − θ)DnB. (16)
The proposition states that the bank manager will only use the bad bank if he
receives sufficient government bonds in exchange for the toxic asset. The transfer
payment Z may not be smaller than the critical payment Z∗OS because otherwise
the manager’s expected costs of the transfer would exceed his expected benefits.
According to (15), the threshold Z∗OS is linearly increasing in the stigma costs B.
For B = B̂, it is equal to the toxic asset’s book value, Z∗OS = θY . In this case, the
bank manager will participate in the bad bank scheme even if the scheme has only
an asset substitution effect without improving bank capital at t = 0. For B > B̂,
the threshold Z∗OS is larger than θY . Then, in order to induce the bank manager to
participate, the scheme must not only allow for asset substitution but also increase
the capital of the bank. This will give the bank manager the opportunity to grant
a larger amount of new profitable loans and will therefore compensate him for the
higher stigma costs. For B < B̂, the threshold Z∗OS is smaller than θY so that the
bank manager will participate in the bad bank scheme even if this is detrimental for
bank capital.
The threshold Z∗OS as defined in (15) increases in the stigma costs since a higher
B implies higher expected costs for the bank manager he must be compensated for:
∂Z∗OS
∂B
= r
θnew(α+r)
> 0. (17)
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If the stigma costs B increases by one unit, expected costs will also increase by one
unit (see the right hand side of equation (14)). Consequently, the transfer payment
Z∗OS must rise until the manager’s expected benefit has also increased by one unit.
1.4 Repurchase of the toxic asset (RA-Scheme)
The bad bank scheme analyzed in this section is comparable to a repurchase agree-
ment (RA). At t = 0, the bank manager can exchange the impaired asset against
safe government bonds Z. However, at t = 1 the bank reobtains the asset and is
obliged to repay Z to the bad bank. Like the OS-scheme, the RA-scheme allows
the bank manager to grant new loans at t = 0, as the government bonds are not
subject to a capital requirement. However, unlike the OS-scheme, the RA-scheme
ensures that the bank still participates in the risks and benefits of the toxic asset.
The idea is that if the new loans turn out to be successful at t = 1, the profit can
offset possible losses from the impaired asset. By transferring the asset to a bad
bank, the bank thus only buys time under this scheme.
The Commercial Bank’s Balance Sheet at t=1 and Expected Capital
Value
Figure 5 illustrates the commercial bank’s balance sheet at t = 1. If the total
(gross) returns K˜ + L˜1 on the toxic asset and the new loans are sufficient to cover
the claim DB of depositors, the bank can fully meet its liabilities. It is thus solvent.
Therefore, the bad bank reobtains the transfer payment Z, the bank uses some of
its investment returns to repay depositors and capital holders receive the residual
proceeds, which are worth K˜ + L˜1 −DB. This case is shown on the left hand side
of Figure 5.
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Assets Liabilities
Government Bonds Z
Toxic Asset K˜
New Loans L˜1
Insurance 0
Deposits DB
Bad Bank Z
Capital K˜ + L˜1 −DB
Solvency: K˜ + L˜1 ≥ DB
Assets Liabilities
Government Bonds Z
Toxic Asset K˜
New Loans L˜1
Insurance DB − (K˜ + L˜1)
Deposits DB
Bad Bank Z
Capital 0
RAS : Insolvency: K˜ + L˜1 < D
B
Assets Liabilities
Government Bonds Z
Toxic Asset K˜
New Loans L˜1
Insurance max{0,DB − (Z + K˜ + L˜1)}
Deposits DB
Bad Bank max{Z + K˜ + L˜1 −DB , 0}
Capital 0
RAJ : Insolvency: K˜ + L˜1 < D
B
Figure 5: Repurchase Agreement, Balance Sheet at t = 1.
What will happen if the total investment returns K˜+ L˜1 fall short of D
B? Then,
the bank will be insolvent at t = 1 because its total liabilities Z+DB will exceed its
total assets Z+K˜+L˜1. Accordingly, capital will be worthless and the order in which
the claim of the bad bank and depositors are served becomes relevant. Suppose first
that the claim of the bad bank is senior to deposits. We will refer to this variant of a
repurchase agreement scheme as the RAS-scheme. Under this scheme, the bad bank
still obtains Z, and the investment returns K˜+ L˜1 are left for repaying deposits. As
these proceeds do not suffice, the deposit insurer must bear the difference between
the claim DB of depositors and the investment returns K˜ + L˜1. The upper balance
sheet on the right hand side of Figure 5 illustrates this scenario. Now, suppose
that the bad bank’s claim is j unior to deposits (RAJ). Then, bank capital is still
worthless and the bad bank becomes the residual claimant (see the lower balance
sheet on the right hand side of Figure 5). If the total assets Z + K˜ + L˜1 cover the
claim DB of depositors, the bank will repay depositors in full so that no assistance
from the deposit insurer is needed. The bad bank receives the residual proceeds
Z + K˜ + L˜1−DB in this case. Otherwise, if the total assets Z + K˜ + L˜1 are smaller
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than DB, they are fully transferred to depositors, and the deposit insurer settles the
depositors’ remaining claims. The bad bank does not receive any payment.
We have seen that the distinction between the two variants of a repurchase
agreement (RAS and RAJ) neither plays a role for the bank’s solvency nor for the
value of bank capital at t = 1, which is equal to min{K˜ + L˜1 −DB, 0}. Therefore,
this distinction is irrelevant for the behavior of the bank manager so that we will
simply refer to the RA-scheme in the rest of this section. However, distinguishing
between the two variants will be highly relevant for the discussion of the policy
implications in section 2.
Let us now have a closer look at the bank’s solvency and capital at t = 1 and
the value of bank capital at this date under the RA-scheme. The bank will be
solvent if the total investment proceeds K˜ + L˜1 of the toxic asset and the new loans
cover the volume of deposits DB. The toxic asset yields K˜ = Y at t = 1 with
probability θ. Otherwise, it yields no return, K˜ = 0. The return on the new loans
at t = 1 is (1 + α)L0 with probability θnew and 0 otherwise. The two investments
are uncorrelated. Therefore, with respect to the total investment return and bank
solvency at t = 1, we need to distinguish between four states of the world (see
Figure 6). (a) With probability θθnew, both investments succeed. Then, the total
return Y + (1 + α)L0 at t = 1 suffices to repay D
B to depositors. The bank is thus
solvent. (b) With probability (1 − θ)θnew, only the new loans succeed. Then, the
total return on the investments is equal to (1+α)L0. Due to (6), this amount covers
the liabilities DB vis-a-vis depositors only if
L0 ≥ DnBα =: L0. (18)
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Both investments succeed:
Only new loans succeed:
Only toxic asset succeeds:
No investment succeeds:
Probability
θθnew
(1− θ)θnew
θ(1− θnew)
(1− θ)(1− θnew)
-L0L0 L0
Probability of Solvency: θ θθnew θnew
solvent
insolvent
solvent
insolvent
solvent
insolvent
insolvent
insolvent
solvent
solvent
insolvent
insolvent
Figure 6: Loan Volume and Bank’s Solvency.
The volume of new loans may thus not be too small because otherwise, the proceeds
of the new loans fall short of the liabilities since these proceeds have to cover the
bank’s new as well as its old liabilities. (c) With probability θ(1 − θnew), only the
toxic asset succeeds. In this case, the total return Y suffices to avoid insolvency
only if Y ≥ DB. Together with (6), this leads to the solvency condition
L0 ≤ Y −DnB =: L0. (19)
To avoid insolvency, the volume of new loans may thus not be too large. This is
because the bank’s liabilities increase in the volume of the new loans and these
liabilities also have to be covered by the proceeds of the toxic asset. (d) With
probability (1−θ)(1−θnew), both investments fail and yield no return at all implying
that the bank is insolvent.
From the four states of the world, we can infer that the expected date t = 1
value of the bank capital in case of participation in the RA-scheme is:
E[V B1 ] = θθnew(Y + (1 + α)L0 −DB) + (1− θ)θnew max{(1 + α)L0 −DB, 0}
+ θ(1− θnew) max
{
Y −DB, 0}+ (1− θ)(1− θnew)0.
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Due to (6), this can be rewritten to
E[V B1 ] = θθnew(Y + αL0 −DnB) + (1− θ)θnew max{αL0 −DnB, 0}
+ θ(1− θnew) max
{
Y −DnB − L0, 0
}
+ (1− θ)(1− θnew)0,
(20)
so that we obtain
∂E[V B1 ]
∂L0
> 0. The expected value of bank capital is thus increasing
in L0 under the RA-scheme.
The Bank Manager’s Optimizing Behavior
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict our subsequent analysis of the bank manager’s
behavior to the plausible case11
(1 + α) ≤ 1
1−(1−r)θ , (21)
which implies L0 ≤ L0. Consequently, figure 6 applies.
Recall from (13) that if the bank manager does not transfer the toxic asset to
the bad bank, the probability of bank solvency will be θ, the bank will only survive
if the toxic asset does not fail. If the manager decides to transfer the asset, the
probability of the bank’s solvency may increase. Figure 6 illustrates that it will
increase if L0 > L0. If L0 < L0, the probability of the bank’s solvency will not
change or even decrease. As the government aims at improving the probability of
11Assuming a minimum capital ratio of r = 0.08 and a probability of repayment of the risky asset
θ = 0.2, the return on the new loans had to exceed α = 0.22 to violate (21). For a rising θ, the
maximum α rises as well.
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the bank’s solvency (we will comment on this in section 2), we assume that the
government offers a transfer payment12
Z ≥ DnB + rDnB
α
=: Z, (22)
which implies Lmax0 ≥ L0. Only with such a transfer payment, the RA-scheme has
the potential to improve the bank’s solvency.
As the bank manager’s utility UB is increasing in E[V B1 ], which in turn is increas-
ing in L0, the manager will grant the maximum volume L
max
0 under the RA-scheme.
From this and (20) in conjunction with (8) and Z ≥ Z, we can infer that the bank
manager’s utility of participating in the RA-scheme satisfies
UB = θθnew(Y + αL
max
0 (Z)−DnB) + θ(1− θnew)0 (23)
+ (1− θ)θnew(αLmax0 (Z)−DnB) + (1− θ)(1− θnew)0−B.
The bank manager will hive off the toxic asset to the bad bank at t = 0 only if
UB ≥ UnB. Due to (13) and (23), this results in
θnewαL
max
0 (Z) ≥ θY (1− θnew) + (θnew − θ)DnB +B. (24)
Analogously to (14), condition (24) states that the bank manager will opt for the
RA-scheme if the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs. According to
the left hand side of (24) the expected benefit of the RA-scheme stems from the
expected return on the new loans as it is the case under the OS-scheme. Unlike the
OS-scheme, however, the RA-scheme does not allow the manager to benefit from
the government bonds because these bonds are either returned to the bad bank at
12One obtains Z by inserting (9) in (18) for L0 = L
max
0 .
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t = 1 or used to repay deposits. The right hand side of (24) reflects his expected
costs. Like an outright sale, the RA-scheme is associated with stigma costs B and
an increase in expected old liabilities (θnew − θ)DnB. Furthermore, the costs of
the RA-scheme consist of a probably foregone potential return on the toxic assets
θY (1 − θnew). While under the OS-scheme the expected return on the toxic asset
is foregone with probability 1, it is foregone under the RA-scheme with probability
1 − θnew only. With this probability, the new loans fail, in which case the bank is
insolvent and the return on the toxic asset has to be used to repay depositors. In
conjunction with (9) and the requirement Z ≥ Z, (24) directly leads to
Proposition 2: Under the RA-scheme, the bank manager will transfer the toxic
asset to the bad bank and the probability of bank solvency increases from θ to θnew
only if
Z ≥ max{Z,Z∗RA}, (25)
where Z∗RA is defined by
Z∗RA = θY +
r
θnewα
(B − B̂). (26)
According to the proposition, the RA-scheme improves the bank’s solvency provided
that two preconditions are met. First, the transfer payment Z and the resulting
volume of new loans must be sufficiently large so that the bank survives whenever
the new loans succeed, Z ≥ Z. Second, it must be sufficiently large to incite the
bank manager to transfer the toxic asset to the bad bank, Z ≥ Z∗RA. As it was the
case under the OS-scheme, the threshold Z∗RA is linearly increasing in the stigma
costs B and equal to the book value θY of the toxic asset for B = B̂. Consequently,
the manager again is satisfied with pure asset substitution (without a change in
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bank capital) if B = B̂. He will require a capital increase, Z∗RA > θY , if B > B̂,
and accept a capital loss, Z∗RA < θY if B < B̂.
The critical stigma costs B̂ relevant for the RA-scheme are identical to those
relevant for the OS-scheme. They again reflect the manager’s expected pecuniary
benefits less his expected pecuniary costs of transferring the toxic asset to the bad
bank in exchange for a transfer payment Z = θY .13 However, the threshold Z∗RA
increases more in B than the threshold Z∗OS:
∂Z∗RA
∂B
= r
θnewα
> r
θnew(α+r)
=
∂Z∗OS
∂B
. (27)
If stigma costs increase by one unit, the transfer payment Z∗ must rise until the
manager’s expected return has also increased by one unit. However, since under
the RA-scheme, the manager never benefits from the proceeds of the government
bonds Z, the marginal expected return of Z is lower than in case of the OS-scheme.
Consequently, the increase in Z must be higher to compensate the manager for
higher stigma costs, which becomes relevant below.
2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the preceding section, we have investigated the incentives of a bank manager to
hive off a toxic asset to a bad bank under two different bad bank schemes. Based
on the results obtained there, this section takes a different perspective and discusses
13According to (24), his expected pecuniary benefits are θnewαL
max
0 , while his expected pecuniary
costs are θY (1 − θnew) + (θnew − θ)DnB . For Z = θY , the benefits will therefore be θnewαθY
(recall from (9) that Lmax0 (Z = θY ) = θY ) so that the critical stigma costs are given by B̂ =
θnewαθY − (1− θnew)θY − (θnew− θ)DnB , which is identical to (16). Intuitively, the RA-scheme
is associated with a lower expected pecuniary benefit and lower expected pecuniary costs than
the OS-scheme. The expected benefit differs by θnewZ = θnewθY because the bank manager
does not obtain the proceeds of the government bonds under the RA-scheme. Expected costs
differ by the same amount θnewθY because under the RA-scheme, the return on the toxic asset
is foregone with probability 1− θnew while it is foregone with certainty under the OS-scheme.
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policy implications of our analysis. We will ask which bad bank scheme is optimal
from the viewpoint of a policy maker who wishes to minimize the expected taxpayers’
costs. We proceed as follows. First, we clarify the costs of the different bad bank
schemes. Then, we determine the cost minimizing scheme for the case that the
policy maker aims at improving the stability of the banking sector in section 2.1,
and avoiding a credit crunch in section 2.2.
2.1 Expected Costs to the Taxpayers
If the policy maker establishes a state-owned bad bank to relief a commercial bank
from its toxic asset, the taxpayers may bear possible losses or may benefit from
possible profits. The different bad bank schemes have different implications with
respect to these losses and gains. Potential payments of the deposit insurer are not
part of the taxpayers’ cost function since the deposit insurance is assumed to be
privately-sponsored.14
Under the OS-scheme, the commercial bank sells the toxic asset to the bad bank.
In return, the commercial bank obtains safe government bonds Z from the bad bank.
Since no further transaction takes place between the commercial bank and the bad
bank, expected taxpayers’ costs are
E[COS] = Z − θY . (28)
14Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven (2005) show that many countries have implemented a
privately-sponsored deposit insurance.
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They consist of the price Z the bad bank pays in form of government bonds for the
toxic asset less its expected return θY . Accordingly, the OS-scheme involves the
possibility of future upside gains for the taxpayers.15
If the policy maker implements the RA-scheme, the bank manager will still ex-
change the toxic asset against government bonds at t = 0. However, this transaction
is reversed in t = 1. The risks and benefits of the toxic asset are thus left to the
commercial bank. The costs of the RA-scheme to the taxpayers depend on whether
the bad bank’s claim Z at t = 1 is senior or junior to deposits. If it is senior (RAS),
the expected costs will be
E[CRAS ] = 0. (29)
The RAS-scheme is thus costless to the taxpayers. This is because the bad bank will
always reobtain the government bonds from the commercial bank at t = 1 under
this scheme, irrespective of whether the commercial bank is solvent or not. The
privately-sponsored deposit insurance will compensate the depositors if the bank
fails.
If the claim of the bad bank is junior to deposits, the taxpayers will only incur
no costs if the commercial bank is solvent and able to return Z to the bad bank at
t = 1.16 We know from Proposition 2 that the commercial bank will be solvent under
the RA-scheme whenever the new loans succeed, which happens with probability
θnew. They fail with probability 1−θnew. Then, the commercial bank is insolvent so
15However, as pointed out by Beck, Coyle, Dewatripont, Freixas, and Seabright (2010, p. 44),
there are strong incentives for politicians to exaggerate the likelihood of this outcome.
16Note that if we assumed that the deposit insurance were government-sponsored, the two RA-
schemes would be equivalent with respect to their expected costs. This is due to the fact that
the bank only has two debtors — the government and the deposit insurer. These two parties
share the costs of a bank’s insolvency depending on the priority of their claims. Assuming a
government-sponsored deposit insurance, the distribution of costs is nonrelevant.
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that the bad bank has a residual claim on the bank’s assets. Therefore, the expected
costs to the taxpayers under the RAJ -scheme will be given by
E[CRAJ ] = θ(1− θnew) min{DB − Y ,Z}+ (1− θ)(1− θnew) min{DB,Z}. (30)
The first term of the right hand side of (30) reflects the taxpayers’ costs if only the
toxic asset succeeds. Then, the return Y on the toxic asset will be used to repay
depositors. To settle the remaining claim DB − Y of depositors the government
bonds will be used. Therefore, the bad bank will either lose government bonds
worth DB − Y or it will lose its total claim Z on the commercial bank, depending
on which amount is smaller. The second term on the right hand side of (30) reflects
the costs if none of the assets succeeds. For this case, essentially the same argument
holds except that there are no returns on the toxic asset in this case. Recall from
the previous section that if the bank manager hives of the toxic asset to the bad
bank, he will always grant the maximum volume Lmax0 of new loans. Due to (6) and
(9), we therefore obtain DB = DnB + Lmax0 > Z, so that (30) becomes
E[CRAJ ] = θ(1− θnew) min{DB − Y ,Z}+ (1− θ)(1− θnew)Z. (31)
2.2 Reestablishing Stability of the Banking Sector
In the financial crisis which started in 2007, a major concern was that the failure
of large, systemically important banks might propagate through the entire financial
system causing substantial instabilities in the banking sector. A policy maker who
wishes to reduce the risk of such banking sector instabilities in times of crisis should
therefore adopt measures to improve the solvency of these systemically important
banks. Our model suggests that a bad bank scheme can be useful in this regard.
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Therefore, this section asks which scheme the policy maker should apply if he wishes
to improve the solvency of a large bank at minimum costs to the taxpayers.
We know from Proposition 1 and 2 that the policy maker can improve the sol-
vency of the bank by offering a bad bank scheme which is sufficiently favorable for
the bank manager to participate. That is, the policy maker must offer sufficient gov-
ernment bonds Z in exchange for the toxic asset, so that the bank manager makes
use of the offer, Z ≥ Z∗OS,Z∗RA. Moreover, in case of the RA-scheme, the volume of
new loans must be large enough (Lmax0 ≥ L0) to avoid insolvency whenever only the
new loans succeed which implies Z ≥ Z. Provided that these conditions are met,
the probability of bank solvency increases from θ to θnew under both, the OS-scheme
and the RA-scheme. Besides, once these conditions are met, any further increase
of the offered transfer payment Z has no effect on the probability of bank solvency.
Therefore, as the expected costs to the taxpayers (weakly) increase in Z, the policy
maker will always offer the smallest possible Z consistent with the bad bank scheme
applied. Denoting the weak (strict) preference relation by  (), we obtain
Proposition 3: If the policy maker aims to improve the probability of solvency of
the commercial bank, his preference order will satisfy
OS  RAS  RAJ if B ≤ B̂,
RAS  OS  RAJ if B ∈ (B̂, ̂̂B),
RAS  RAJ  OS if B ≥ ̂̂B,
(32)
where B̂ is defined in (16) and where
̂̂
B > B̂ denotes the critical stigma costs for
which E[COS(Z
∗
OS)] = E[CRAJ (max{Z,Z∗RA})].
Proof: See appendix.
30
The proposition reveals the policy maker’s preference order with respect to the
different bad bank schemes. Let us now comment on this preference order.
(a) From the policy maker’s point of view the repurchase agreement in which the
bad bank’s claim is senior to deposits (RAS-scheme) is always superior to the one in
which it is junior to deposits (RAJ -scheme). This is not surprising. As long as the
claim of the bad bank has priority over deposits, the bad bank will reobtain Z at
t = 1 even if the commercial bank fails. Accordingly, the bad bank reobtains Z with
certainty. In contrast, the repayment of Z is uncertain under the RAJ -scheme. As
the claim of the bad bank is subordinated to deposits, the bad bank will reobtain
less than Z (maybe even nothing) if the commercial bank is insolvent. Consequently,
RAS  RAJ for all B.
(b) The stigma costs B become crucial for the preference order when taking an
outright sale (OS-scheme) into account. At low stigma costs (B ≤ B̂), the policy
maker prefers an outright sale of the toxic asset over both variants of the repurchase
agreement (RA). The relatively low stigma costs imply that the transfer payment
Z is also relatively low. This means that under the OS-scheme, the transfer is
associated with an expected profit for the taxpayers (Z ≤ θY ). This profit is out
of reach under both RA-schemes since possible proceeds of the toxic asset remain
with the commercial bank. Consequently, OS  RAS,RAJ for B ≤ B̂.
(c) For stigma costs being higher than B̂, the transfer payment Z∗ must be higher
than θY . In this case, an outright sale of the toxic asset to the bad bank leads to
an expected loss to the taxpayers. Since the RAS-scheme is costless to taxpayers
(they reobtain the transfer payment Z with certainty), RAS  OS for all B > B̂.
(d) For stigma costs being higher than B̂ but lower than
̂̂
B, the OS-scheme
is superior to the RAJ -scheme, while for stigma costs higher than
̂̂
B, the policy
maker prefers the RAJ -scheme over the OS-scheme. The explanation for this result
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is as follows. From the policy maker’s point of view the advantage of the OS-
scheme is that the taxpayers may benefit from potential proceeds of the toxic asset.
However, the disadvantage is that the transfer payment Z is lost, irrespective of
the outcome of the toxic asset. In contrast, the bad bank does not participate in
potential proceeds of the toxic asset under the RAJ -scheme but possibly reobtains
Z. For relatively small stigma costs B <
̂̂
B, Z∗ is that small that the advantage of
the OS-scheme of participating in possible proceeds of the toxic asset outweighs the
advantage of the RAJ -scheme of possibly reobtaining Z
∗. Instead, for B ≥ ̂̂B the
transfer payment Z∗ becomes that high that reobtaining Z∗ is more important so
that the advantage of the RAJ -scheme outweighs the advantage of the OS-scheme.
Consequently, OS  RAJ for B < ̂̂B and RAJ  OS for B ≥ ̂̂B.
2.3 Avoiding a Credit Crunch
As the recent financial crisis unfolded, not only the stability of the banking sector
was a major issue. There were also fears that the financial crisis might lead to a
credit crunch (European Central Bank, 2007). We have seen in section 1 that a bad
bank scheme can foster new lending. In doing so, it can serve as a measure to avoid
a credit crunch. In this section, we ask which bad bank scheme a policy maker will
apply if he aims at improving the solvency of a single commercial bank as well as
fostering new lending to prevent a credit crunch at minimum expected costs.
A bad bank scheme relieves a commercial bank from its toxic asset at least
temporarily. The commercial bank obtains safe government bonds Z in exchange
for its toxic asset. Unlike this toxic asset, the government bonds must not be backed
with capital. Therefore, the bad bank scheme allows the bank manager to grant new
loans with the maximum volume of new loans Lmax0 increasing in Z. We have argued
above that under both, the OS- and the RA-scheme, the bank manager will indeed
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grant this maximum volume of new loans. Accordingly, if the policy maker has a
target minimum loan volume Lpm0 , it follows from (9) that he must offer a transfer
price
Z ≥ θY + r(Lpm0 − θY ) =: Zpm. (33)
In addition, the offer of the policy maker must also satisfy Z ≥ Z∗OS or Z ≥
max{Z∗RA,Z} to make sure that the bank manager has an incentive to participate
in the respective bad bank scheme and that the solvency of the bank improves. This
leads us to
Proposition 4: If the policy maker aims to improve the solvency of the commercial
bank and to ensure that the loan volume of the commercial bank does not fall short
of Lpm0 , his preference order will satisfy
1. If B ≤ B̂
OS  RAS  RAJ if Lpm0 ≤ θY ,
RAS  OS  RAJ if Lpm0 ∈ (θY ; L̂pm0 ),
RAS  RAJ  OS if Lpm0 ≥ L̂pm0 .
(34)
2. If B ∈ (B̂, ̂̂B)
RAS  OS  RAJ if Lpm0 < L̂pm0 ,
RAS  RAJ  OS if Lpm0 ≥ L̂pm0 .
(35)
3. If B ≥ ̂̂B
RAS  RAJ  OS for all Lpm0 , (36)
where B̂ is defined in (16),
̂̂
B denotes the critical stigma costs for which
E[COS(Z
∗
OS)] = E[CRAJ (max{Z,Z∗RA})], and L̂pm denotes the critical amount of
new loans that corresponds to the critical transfer payment Ẑ > θY for which
E[COS(max{Ẑ,Z∗OS)] = E[CRAJ (max{Ẑ,Z,Z∗RA})].
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Proof: See appendix
The proposition states that the policy maker’s preference order depends on the
stigma costs and the target loan volume Lpm0 . Like in Proposition 3, this result
reflects the costs and benefits of the different bad bank schemes to the taxpayers,
and, therefore, to the policy maker.
(a) The policy maker will always prefer the RAS-scheme over the RAJ -scheme
as the former is costless while the latter implies a loss of the transfer payment Z
with positive probability.
(b) To determine the preference order with respect to the RA-schemes and the
OS-scheme we have to distinguish between different levels of the stigma costs and
the target loan volume. Under the OS-scheme, the policy maker loses the transfer
payment with certainty but benefits from the return on the toxic asset. Accordingly,
an outright sale will be most preferred whenever the transfer payment Z is smaller
than the expected return θY on the toxic asset, i.e. whenever the transfer implies
a capital loss for the bank. Then, the OS-scheme allows for a profit for the policy
maker, which is out of reach under a repurchase agreement. The policy maker will
be able to make such a profit only if two conditions are met. First, the stigma costs
B of the bank manager must be sufficiently small, B ≤ B̂, so that he accepts the
OS-scheme even if this leads to a capital loss for the bank. Second, the target loan
volume Lpm0 of the policy maker must be sufficiently small, L
pm
0 ≤ θY , so that it can
even be reached if the bank loses capital.
(c) If one of these just mentioned conditions is violated, the transfer payment
under the OS-scheme must exceed the expected return on the toxic asset. In this
case, the policy maker will prefer the costless RAS-scheme over the costly OS-
scheme. Moreover, if both, the stigma costs B and the target loan volume Lpm0 are at
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most intermediate, the transfer payment under the OS-scheme will be intermediate
as well so that an outright sale leads to lower costs than the RAJ -scheme.
(d) Only if either the stigma costs or the target loan volume are large, the policy
maker must offer a rather large transfer payment. Then, he prefers to reobtain
the transfer payment with at least some probability under the RAJ -scheme over
benefiting from the return on the toxic asset under an outright sale.
3 SUMMARY
The worldwide financial crisis that broke out in 2007 led to severe losses for
banks caused by toxic assets. As a response, several governments implemented bad
banks to relieve banks’ balance sheets from these assets.
In our paper, we have focussed on two different bad bank schemes and their
appropriateness for achieving a policy maker’s objectives of reestablishing stability
and avoiding a credit crunch. First, we have discussed an outright sale of the toxic
asset to the bad bank. Second, we have analyzed a repurchase agreement. We
have shown that under both schemes, there exists a critical transfer payment that
induces the bank manager to participate in the bad bank. If the policy maker offers
a transfer payment that is sufficiently large so that the bank manager will hive
off the toxic asset, the bank’s probability of solvency will increase. Whenever the
commercial bank is systemically important, this will improve the stability of the
banking sector. Consequently, both bad bank schemes are appropriate instruments
to reestablish stability. Moreover, we have shown that a transfer of the toxic asset
to the bad bank will release bank’s equity. Therefore, the bank is able to grant new
loans. The policy maker is able to control the amount of new loans by offering a
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corresponding transfer payment. Consequently, both bad bank schemes are able to
avoid a credit crunch.17
However, the two schemes differ with respect to their expected costs to the
taxpayers. On the one hand, an outright sale allows the policy maker to benefit from
potential returns on the toxic asset. On the other hand, a repurchase agreement
allows the policy maker to possibly reobtain the transfer payment which is lost
under an outright sale. Therefore, only if the transfer payment is sufficiently low,
e.g. caused by low stigma costs or a low target loan volume, the policy maker mostly
prefers an outright sale. Otherwise, if the transfer payment is rather large due to
high stigma costs or a target loan volume, a scheme with a repurchase agreement is
preferred.
17In our model, the implications of a bad bank scheme with a repurchase agreement are equivalent
to revoking capital requirements. However, in practice the advantage of a bad bank scheme over
a mitigation of capital requirements is that a bad banks scheme cleans banks’ balance sheets
from toxic assets at least temporarily.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3
We proceed in two steps. First, we determine the minimum expected costs E[Cmink ]
under the different bad bank schemes k = OS,RAS,RAJ . Second, we derive the
preference order of the policy maker by comparing the respective minimum expected
costs.
First Step: Minimum Expected Costs of the Policy Maker
The policy maker will always offer the smallest possible Z, which is consistent with
the respective bad bank scheme. By inserting these critical transfer payments as
given in Proposition 1 and 2 in the corresponding expected cost functions as given
in (28), (29) and (31), we obtain
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
∗
OS)] = Z
∗
OS − θY = rθnew(α+r) [B − B̂], (37)
E[CminRAS ] = 0, (38)
E[CminRAJ ] = E[CRAJ (max{Z,Z∗RA})]. (39)
Before we proceed with the second step, it is useful to have a closer look at (39).
Note that if the bank manager hives of the toxic asset to the bad bank, he will
always grant the maximum volume Lmax0 of new loans. Inserting this and (6) in
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(31), where we use L0 as defined in (19) for the sake of a less complex presentation,
yields
E[CRAJ (Z)] = θ(1− θnew) min{Lmax0 − L0,Z}+ (1− θ)(1− θnew)Z. (40)
As E[CRAJ (Z)] is increasing in Z (note that L
max
0 is increasing in Z, see (9)), we
can rewrite (39) to
E[CminRAJ ] = max{E[CRAJ (Z)],E[CRAJ (Z∗RA)]}. (41)
Moreover, two properties of (40) will be important in the following. (a) If Z = Z,
it follows from (9) and (22) that Lmax0 = L0. Insertion of this and Z in (40) yields
E[CRAJ (Z)] = θ(1− θnew) min{L0 − L0,Z}+ (1− θ)(1− θnew)Z > 0. (42)
(b) If Z = Z∗RA, it follows from inserting (26) in (9) that L
max
0 = θY +
B−B̂
θnewα
.
Insertion of this and (26) in (40) yields
E[CRAJ (Z
∗
RA)] = θ(1− θnew) min{θY + B−B̂θnewα − L0, θY + rθnewα [B − B̂]}
+ (1− θ)(1− θnew)(θY + rθnewα [B − B̂]).
(43)
Second step: Preference Order of the Policy Maker
We now derive the preference order of the policy maker. As he aims at minimizing
his expected costs, we obtain:
• He always prefers the RAS-scheme over the RAJ -scheme, RAS  RAJ , be-
cause (38), (41) and (42) imply E[CminRAS ] = 0 < E[C
min
RAJ
].
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• He prefers the RAS-scheme over the OS-scheme, RAS  OS, only if
E[CminRAS ] < E[C
min
OS ]. Due to (37) and (38), this condition results in B > B̂.
• He prefers the OS-scheme over the RAJ -scheme, OS  RAJ , only if E[CminOS ] <
E[CminRAJ ]. Due to (37) and (41), this condition is met if either
E[COS(Z
∗
OS)] =
r
θnew(α+r)
[B − B̂] < E[CRAJ (Z)] (44)
or
E[COS(Z
∗
OS)] =
r
θnew(α+r)
[B − B̂] < E[CRAJ (Z∗RA)]. (45)
Now, note that the left hand side of (44) and (45) is equal to zero for B = B̂
and linearly increasing in B with
∂E[COS(Z
∗
OS)]
∂B
= r
θnew(α+r)
. (46)
Moreover:
– It follows from (42) and the definition of Z as given in (22) that the right
hand side of (44) is positive and independent of B. Accordingly, there
exists a Bcrit
Z
> B̂ such that:
∗ the condition (44) is met if B < Bcrit
Z
,
∗ the condition (44) is violated if B ≥ Bcrit
Z
,
so that we can already conclude that if B < B̂ < Bcrit
Z
, it follows that
OS  RAJ .
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– Therefore, we can now restrict our attention to B ≥ B̂. It follows from
(43) and the definition of L0 that the right hand side of (45) is strictly
positive for B = B̂ and linearly increasing in B with
∂E[CRAJ (Z
∗
RA)]
∂B
=
 (1− θnew)
θ+(1−θ)r
θnewα
if B − B̂ < θnewαL0
1−r
(1− θnew) rθnewα <
∂E[COS(Z
∗
OS)]
∂B
if B − B̂ ≥ θnewαL0
1−r .
(47)
Accordingly, there exists a BcritZ∗RA > B̂ such that
∗ the condition (45) is met if B ∈ [B̂,BcritZ∗RA),
∗ the condition (45) is violated if B ≥ BcritZ∗RA .
From the two cases, it directly follows that OS  RAJ only if B < ̂̂B witĥ̂
B := max{Bcrit
Z
,BcritZ∗RA}.
Proof of Proposition 4
We know from (33) that if the policy maker has a target minimum loan volume Lpm0 ,
he must offer government bonds worth
Z ≥ θY + r(Lpm0 − θY ) =: Zpm. (48)
There is thus a one-to-one relationship between Lpm0 and Z
pm. For the sake of
simplicity, we will use the minimum transfer payment Zpm instead of the target
minimum loan volume Lpm0 to prove the preference order of the policy maker.
We proceed in three steps. First, we clarify the minimum expected costs to
the taxpayers, and thus the policy maker, under the different bad bank schemes.
Second, we derive an intermediate result to simplify the proof. Third, we determine
the preference order of the policy maker.
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First Step: Minimum Expected Costs to the Taxpayers
If the policy maker wishes to ensure that the bank manager grants at least new
loans Lpm, it follows from (15), (25) and (48) that he must offer a transfer payment
Z ≥ max{Z∗OS,Zpm} under the OS-scheme while he must offer a payment Z ≥
max{Z,Z∗RA,Zpm} under the RA-scheme. Therefore, we obtain from (28), (29) and
(31) for the policy maker’s minimum expected costs
E
[
CminOS
]
= E [COS (max {Z∗OS,Zpm})] , (49)
E
[
CminRAS
]
= 0, (50)
E
[
CminRAJ
]
= E
[
CRAJ
(
max
{
Z∗RA,Z,Z
pm
})]
> 0. (51)
Second Step: An Intermediate Result
Let us for now assume that the policy maker offers the same transfer payment
Z ≥ θY under the OS-scheme and the RAJ -scheme. Then, there exists a Zˇ > θY
such that
E[COS(Z)] < E[CRAJ (Z)] if Z ∈ [θY , Zˇ),
E[COS(Z)] ≥ E[CRAJ (Z)] if Z ≥ Zˇ.
(52)
That is, for small Z the OS-scheme is always preferred over the RAJ -scheme while
for large Z the preference order changes and the RAJ -scheme is preferred over the
OS-scheme. This is because
• on the one hand, it follows from (28) that E[COS] = 0 if Z = θY and that
E[COS] is increasing in Z with
∂E[COS ]
∂Z
= 1,
• on the other hand, inserting (6) and (9) in (31) yields
E [CRAJ ] = θ(1− θnew) min{DnB + 1r (Z −DnB)− Y ,Z}+ (1− θ)(1− θnew)Z
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implying E[CRAJ ] > 0 for all Z ≥ θY and that E[CRAJ ] is increasing in Z
with
∂E[CRAJ ]
∂Z
=

θ(1−θnew)
r
+ (1− θ) (1− θnew) if Z < DnB + r1−rY
(1− θnew) < 1 if Z ≥ DnB + r1−rY .
(53)
Third step: Preference Order of the Policy Maker
We will now derive the preference order of the policy maker with respect to the
OS-scheme, the RAS-scheme and the RAJ -scheme. As a direct consequence of (50)
and (51), we obtain RAS  RAJ . The preference order with respect to the OS-
scheme, on the one hand, and the two RA-schemes, on the other hand, depends on
the stigma costs B. We will distinguish between three cases: B ≤ B̂, B ∈ (B̂, ̂̂B),
and B ≥ ̂̂B.
Case a: B ≤ Bˆ
Suppose that B ≤ Bˆ. Then (15) and (26) implies Z∗OS ≤ θY and Z∗RA ≤ θY .
1. For Zpm ≤ θY , the transfer payment under the OS-scheme satisfies
max {Z∗OS,Zpm} ≤ θY so that (49), (50) and (51) in conjunction with (28)
implies E[CminOS ] ≤ 0 = E[CRAS ] < E[CRAJ ]. This leads to the preference
order OS  RAS  RAJ .
2. For Zpm > θY , it follows from (49) and (51) in conjunction with (28) that
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
pm)] > 0 (54)
E[CminRAJ ] =
 E[CRAJ (Z)] if Z
pm ≤ Z
E[CRAJ (Z
pm)] if Zpm > Z
. (55)
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Note that (50) and (54) directly lead to E[CminOS ] > E[C
min
RAS
] and thus
RAS  OS. To derive the preference order with respect to the OS-scheme and
the RAJ -scheme for the case Z
pm > θY , it is useful to distinguish between
different levels of Zpm.
(a) Suppose that Zpm ∈ (θY , Z˜). Then, we have
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
pm)] < E[CRAJ (Z
pm)] ≤ E[CminRAJ ].
The first (in)equality follows from (54), the second follows from (52) and
the third follows from (55). Accordingly, we obtain OS  RAJ in this
case.
(b) Suppose that Zpm ≥ max{Z˜,Z}. Then, we have
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
pm)] ≥ E[CRAJ (Zpm)] = E[CminRAJ ].
Again, the first (in)equality follows from (54), the second follows from
(52) and the third follows from (55). Accordingly, we obtain RAJ  OS
in this case.
(c) Suppose that Zpm ∈ [Z˜, max{Z˜,Z}), which is feasible only if Z˜ < Z.
Then, it follows from (54) and (55) in conjunction with (28) that
∂E[CminOS ]
∂Zpm
= 1 and
∂E[CminRAJ
]
∂Zpm
= 0.
Consequently, we can conclude that there exists a Zˆ > θY such that
• RAS  OS  RAJ if Zpm ∈ (θY , Zˆ) and thus Lpm0 ∈ (θY , Lˆpm0 ),
• RAS  RAJ  OS if Zpm ≥ Zˆ and thus Lpm0 ≥ Lˆpm0 .
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Case b: B ∈ (Bˆ, ˆˆB)
Suppose that B ∈ (Bˆ, ˆˆB). Then (15) and (26) implies Z∗RA > Z∗OS > θY .
1. For Zpm ≤ Z∗OS the transfer payment under the OS-scheme satisfies
max{Z∗OS,Zpm} = Z∗OS and the transfer payment under the RA-schemes sat-
isfies max{Z,Z∗RA,Zpm} = max{Z,Z∗RA}. Therefore, like in Proposition 3, we
obtain RAS  OS  RAJ .
2. For Zpm > Z∗OS, it follows from (49) and (51) in conjunction with (28) that
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
pm)] > 0 (56)
E[CminRAJ ] =
 E[CRAJ (max{Z,Z
∗
RA})] if Zpm ≤ max{Z,Z∗RA}
E[CRAJ (Z
pm)] if Zpm > max{Z,Z∗RA}
. (57)
Note that (50) and (56) directly lead to E[CminOS ] > E[C
min
RAS
] and thus RAS 
OS. To derive the preference order with respect to the OS-scheme and the
RAJ -scheme for the case Z
pm > Z∗OS , it is useful to distinguish between
different levels of Zpm.
(a) Suppose that Zpm ∈ (Z∗OS, Z˜), which is feasible only if Z˜ > Z∗OS. Then,
we have
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
pm)] < E[CRAJ (Z
pm)] ≤ E[CminRAJ ].
The first (in)equality follows from (56), the second follows from (52) and
the third follows from (57). Accordingly, we obtain OS  RAJ in this
case.
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(b) Suppose that Zpm ≥ max{Z˜, max{Z,Z∗RA}}. Then, we have
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
pm)] ≥ E[CRAJ (Zpm)] = E[CminRAJ ].
Again, the first (in)equality follows from (56), the second follows from
(52) and the third follows from (57). Accordingly, we obtain RAJ  OS
in this case.
(c) Suppose that Zpm ∈ [Z˜, max{Z˜, max{Z,Z∗RA}}), which is feasible only if
Z˜ < max{Z,Z∗RA}. Then, it follows from (56) and (57) in conjunction
with (28) that
∂E[CminOS ]
∂Zpm
= 1 and
∂E[CminRAJ
]
∂Zpm
= 0.
Consequently, we can conclude that there exists a Zˆ > θY such that
• RAS  OS  RAJ if Zpm ∈ (θY , Zˆ) and thus Lpm0 ∈ (θY , Lˆpm0 ),
• RAS  RAJ  OS if Zpm ≥ Zˆ and thus Lpm0 ≥ Lˆpm0 .
Case c: B ≥ ̂̂B
Suppose that B ≥ ̂̂B. Then (15) and (26) implies Z∗RA > Z∗OS > θY .
1. For Zpm ≤ Z∗OS the transfer payment under the OS-scheme satisfies
max{Z∗OS,Zpm} = Z∗OS and the transfer payment under the RA-schemes sat-
isfies max{Z,Z∗RA,Zpm} = max{Z,Z∗RA}. Therefore, like in Proposition 3, we
obtain RAS  RAJ  OS.
2. For Zpm > Z∗OS, it follows from (49) and (51) in conjunction with (28) that
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
pm)] > E[COS(Z
∗
OS)] > 0 (58)
E[CminRAJ ] =
 E[CRAJ (max{Z,Z
∗
RA})] if Zpm ≤ max{Z,Z∗RA}
E[CRAJ (Z
pm)] if Zpm > max{Z,Z∗RA}
. (59)
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Note that (50) and (58) directly lead to E[CminOS ] > E[C
min
RAS
] and thus RAS 
OS. To derive the preference order with respect to the OS-scheme and the
RAJ -scheme for the case Z
pm > Z∗OS , it is useful to distinguish between
different levels of Zpm.
(a) Suppose that Zpm ≤ max{Z,Z∗RA}. Then, we have
E[CminOS ] > E[COS(Z
∗
OS)] ≥ E[CRAJ (max{Z,Z∗RA})] = E[CminRAJ ].
The first (in)equality follows from (58), the second follows from Proposi-
tion 3 and the third follows from (59). Accordingly, we obtain RAJ  OS
in this case.
(b) Suppose that Zpm > max{Z,Z∗RA}. Then, we have
E[CminOS ] = E[COS(Z
pm)] ≥ E[CRAJ (Zpm)] = E[CminRAJ ].
Again, the first (in)equality follows from (58), the second follows from
Proposition 3 and the third follows from (59). Accordingly, we obtain
RAJ  OS in this case.
Consequently, we can conclude that RAS  RAJ  OS.
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